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REFUSING THE REALITY PILL: A FILM
STUDIES PERSPECTIVE ON
PROSTHETIC MEMORY
10 MARTS 2016 / CASPER TYBJERG
PEER REVIEWED
This article is a critique of Alison Landsberg's concept of prosthetic
memory. It has been highly influential in the fields of history and cultural
memory studies, but here the focus is on the concept’s basis in film theory
and on its roots in the analysis of Total Recall and Blade Runner, science
fiction movies that dramatize issues of memory and identity. Key aspects
of these movies’ narrative design, however, undermine Landsberg's
central argument that prosthetic memories have the potential to transform
film spectators in a progressive, utopian direction.
Blade Runner (Final Cut 2007): Harrison Ford as Rick Deckard. Filmcompagniet/Warner.
In academic discussions of how popular media present history, references to Alison Landsberg’s
concept of prosthetic memory have become almost ubiquitous. The concept has grown out of an
analysis of a pair of science fiction movies that dramatize issues of memory and identity. The aim of
the present article is to examine Landsberg’s work from a film studies perspective. I shall argue
that the concept of prosthetic memory gives a misleading suggestion of the degree and kind of
impact that dramatically engaging movies or other kinds of popular audiovisual fictions have on
spectators’ personalities.
 
Total Recall (1990): Quaid (Arnold Schwarzenegger) in the prosthetic memory apparatus, just before he loses




Landsberg’s concept of prosthetic memory derives from two science fiction films, Blade Runner
(1982/Director’s Cut 1992/Final Cut 2007) and Total Recall (1990); both take place in worlds where
literal prosthetic memories exist. She extends the concept metaphorically to describe the kind of
vicarious experience of the past we may get from historical films and other media representations
of the past. I shall argue, however, that both films portray prosthetic memory as something sinister,
with associations of manipulation and brain-washing; in particular, my discussion of the movie Total
Recall will show that a key aspect of the movie’s narrative design undermines Landsberg’s central
argument for seeing prosthetic memories as having a radical, utopian, transformative potential.
Moreover, much of the film theory Landsberg draws on points in the same direction. While
Landsberg has astute things to say about the embodied, direct character of the spectator’s
experience of moving pictures, she relies on film theories that present the film experience as
disembodied and deceptive. I shall argue that the concept of prosthetic memory is fundamentally
flawed, because the associations of falsity and manipulation are too strong to escape, and I advise
against using it. Instead, film theories like Torben Grodal’s can give an account of spectators’
engagement with films that explains how they can produce the kind of personal experience and
understanding the concept was meant to describe.
Caught Up In Movies
Landsberg’s essay “Prosthetic Memory: Blade Runner and Total Recall” first appeared in 1995 in a
special issue of the journal Body & Society (Landsberg 1995), also published as a free-standing
cyber-culture anthology with the same pagination (Featherstone and Burrows 1996). The essay was
reprinted in two other anthologies (Bell and Kennedy 2000; Redmond 2004), and was then
expanded to form the first chapter of her book Prosthetic Memory (Landsberg 2004). The article in
its various incarnations has been cited more than a hundred times and the book 565 times,
according to Google Scholar (consulted on 19 September 2015). There is another 2003 article by
Landsberg which is also called “Prosthetic Memory,” but which has a different subtitle and contains
different material (Landsberg 2003). The many citations testify to the wide attention the concept of
“prosthetic memory” has received [1].The concept’s basis in films and film studies has remained
unexamined, however, even in detailed review essays (like, for instance, Berger 2007; Munslow
2007).
At the beginning of Prosthetic Memory, Landsberg defines the concept in the following way:
This book argues that modernity makes possible and necessary a new form of public cultural memory. This new form of memory, which I call
prosthetic memory, emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as a
movie theater or museum. In this moment of contact, an experience occurs through which the person sutures himself or herself into a larger
history [...]. In the process that I am describing, the person does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal,
deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live. 
 (Landsberg 2004, 2)
The “personal, deeply felt” aspect is crucial; this is what differentiates the prosthetic memory from
regular historical knowledge. Landsberg credits modern media like the cinema with the ability to
affect spectators on this deep, personal level. “To me, this is memory and not simply knowledge of
history, because it involves an affective relationship to the past” (Landsberg 2007, 628). What we
know is of course also something we remember, but the distinction Landsberg is getting at is a well-
established one in memory research: the distinction between semantic memory (Landsberg’s
“knowledge”), the things we remember as facts, without any personal, affective dimension – that,
for instance, the Lumière brothers’ first public film show took place at the Grand Café in Paris on 28
December 1895; and episodic or autobiographical memory (simply “memory” to Landsberg), the
things we remember with a personal flavor – like the fascination I felt when I sat down in the
reconstruction of the room at the Grand Café at the big Lumière exposition in Paris in 2015 (for an
overview of memory research and terminology, see Markowitsch 2010). Because of the ability of
fiction films to absorb us emotionally, the experience of watching one will often feel more like an
autobiographical memory than a semantic one (see Tybjerg forthcoming).
Landsberg does not go into a great deal of detail about how this experiential process works, but she
does refer on several occasions to the concept of “suture.” Psychoanalytic film theory has
metaphorically extended the concept from meaning the surgical stitching-together of a wound to
describe the supposed process through which film spectators become absorbed by movies,
immersing themselves in their stories and being “stitched” into the film. Landsberg refers to
“suture” in both her initial definition of prosthetic memory and elsewhere, relying on psychoanalytic
film theory: “What I find interesting in this work on spectatorship is that film is imagined as an
instrument with the power to ‘suture’ viewers into pasts they have not lived. […] Like cinema,
television and experiential museums also provide the occasion for individual spectators to suture
themselves into history, to develop prosthetic memories.” (Landsberg 2004, 14; citing Silverman
1986) [2].
In film theory, the concept of suture developed during the 1970s (for a sympathetic account, see
Cubitt 2014). Its basic postulate is that after an initial immersion in the film image, the film
spectator becomes (unconsciously) aware of the frame, and thereby also aware that the origin of
the film itself is absent, hidden; but this anxiety-inducing awareness is assuaged by a cut to
another camera setup that shows the absent space, re-immersing the spectator in an illusion of
fictional wholeness. Particularly important here, it is claimed, is the linking of camera setups to the
gazes of characters: “In the shot-reverse shot, for example, cuts from one speaker or protagonist
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to another allow the spectator to put himself or herself in the position of whichever character is
offscreen at any moment; and thus to experience being caught up in, and part of, the space and
the action on the screen” (Kuhn and Westwell 2012, s.v. “suture”).
The suture concept suffers from a number of problems. It has no basis in evidence, relying entirely
on speculative psychoanalytic claims (Carroll 1988, 183-99; Allen 1995, 34-39), and even its basic
theoretical terms like “frame” seem arbitrary (Branigan 2006, 133-45). The degree to which
Landsberg is beholden to the tenets of suture theory criticized by Carroll, Allen, and Branigan is
unclear; but in at least three ways, suture theory contradicts her own description of the workings of
prosthetic memory.
A fundamental aspect of suturing is that it is a process of illusion that is not consciously perceived
by spectators, but deceptively and fraudulently conceals itself from them: “This sleight-of-hand
involves attributing to a character within the fiction qualities which in fact belong to the machinery
of enunciation: the ability to generate narrative, the omnipotent and coercive gaze, the castrating
authority of the law” (Silverman 1983, 232; 1986, 234). Prosthetic memories, on the other hand,
do not pass themselves off as something they are not. Landsberg is quite explicit that prosthetic
memories are not deceptive: “Calling these memories prosthetic not only signals their usefulness,
but also calls attention to their artificiality, to their unnaturalness. One uses them like memories,
and even comes to own them, but never confuses them with one’s own lived experiences”
(Landsberg 2007, 629; emphasis added).
The usefulness that Landsberg refers to in this passage is an extension of one’s imaginative
sympathies to include pasts that are not one’s own: “being put in the position of seeing through
someone else’s eyes might change how one sees the world and one’s place in it” (Landsberg 2004,
101). But although Landsberg does not say so explicitly, there must necessarily be a cognitive
component to this, since it specifically involves historical narratives – films that, even though they
are fictional films and not documentaries, still purport to show actual events. If they are to be
useful in the way Landsberg argues they can be, spectators must be aware that the viewpoints they
are invited to assume belong to someone else, and that they belong in the past. Yet suturing, as it
is usually described, is an effect produced by all mainstream movies equally, not just historical
films. Moreover, its operations are supposed to take place irresistibly – “We want suture so badly
that we’ll take it at any price” – and unconsciously – “the viewer’s real relation to the cinema is
concealed by an imaginary one” (Silverman 1983, 212, 216).
Finally, Landsberg repeatedly emphasizes that prosthetic memories are embodied: “these
memories, like an artificial limb, are actually worn on the body; these are sensuous memories
produced by an experience of mass-mediated representations” (Landsberg 2004, 20); “as
memories are taken on and experienced sensuously, they become grounded in a person’s body”
(Landsberg 2004, 148). In support of this, she refers to the book The Cinematic Body by film
theorist Steven Shaviro. But while Landsberg does acknowledge that Shaviro’s work represents a
“shifting emphasis” from psychoanalytically based theory (Landsberg 2004, 163 n62; also 167
n24), Shaviro puts it in much stronger terms: “The psychoanalytic model for film theory is at this
point utterly bankrupt; it needs not to be refined and reformed, but to be discarded altogether”
(Shaviro 1993, ix). This includes its central “themes” like suture, which “must be abandoned”
(Shaviro 1993, 265). The psychoanalytic model seeks to subordinate the image to textuality and
discursivity; for suture theorists, as Sean Cubitt writes, “the first important thesis is that any film is
a discourse” (Cubitt 2014, 453). But this view “suppresses the body,” in Shaviro’s opinion: “It
ignores or abstracts away from the primordial forms of raw sensation: affect, excitation, stimulation
and repression, pleasure and pain, shock and habit” (Shaviro 1993, 27).
As Landsberg describes them, then, prosthetic memories are embodied and they allow one to take
on the perspectives of others, but without them becoming confused with one’s own memories.
However, suture theory and the psychological mechanisms it purports to describe cannot account
for them, and we should look at whether other film theories might be able to give a more plausible
explanation for the experiential effects Landsberg describes. But before we do that, we need to
examine the conceptual basis for the notion of prosthetic memory. Here, Landsberg does not rely
on either theories of spectatorship or psychology of memory. Instead, she presents interpretations
of two science fiction films where literal prosthetic memories are part of the plot, and then extends
the concept metaphorically. The films do not, however, present prosthetic memory the way she
says; moreover, the metaphorical extension integral to her argument has implications that run
directly counter to her theoretical suppositions.
Artificial Humans, Real Memories
In certain science fiction universes, technology has made it possible to implant artificial memories
into people’s minds, providing them with actual prosthetic memories. In Blade Runner, artificial
humans exist, and some are given artificial memories to make them more human-like. In the world
of Total Recall, there are private enterprises that sell memories, artificial experiences like travels to
outer space locations that would be much too expensive for most people in the fictional world to
visit in person. In both cases, the implications of the notion of prosthetic memory are disturbing
and sinister, and Landsberg’s attempts to portray it as something liberating and empathy-enhancing
are correspondingly unconvincing. I will go into some detail in my discussion of the films; the point
is not to do film criticism, but Landsberg’s explanation of what prosthetic memory is and how it
works depends as much on the interpretation of these films as it does on psychology or film theory,
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and it is necessary to show clearly how these interpretations fail. I will begin with Blade Runner, but
I shall focus mostly on Total Recall, since it makes prosthetic memory much more central to its
plot.
In Blade Runner, only the most advanced artificial humans (“replicants”) are given prosthetic
memories to make them think they are real humans, and only one (or perhaps two) such replicants
appear in the film. One is the glamorous Rachel (Sean Young), who is initially unaware that she is a
replicant; later, the film’s hero, Rick Deckard (Harrison Ford) – a cop who hunts down and liquidates
runaway replicants – reveals to her that he is familiar with some of her most private childhood
memories: they are implants, so she must be a replicant. The other replicant with prosthetic
memories may be Deckard himself: in the Director’s Cut and Final Cut versions of the film, Deckard
dreams of a unicorn. At the end of the film, Deckard finds a small origami unicorn left for him by
Gaff, another replicant-hunter. The paper figure suggests that Gaff knows the recesses of Deckard’s
mind, and that Deckard must therefore be a replicant too.
Landsberg argues that these plot elements efface the distinction between real and artificial
memories, and what matters is what you do with the memories you have, irrespective of their
origin: “it might not always be possible to determine whether those memories come from lived
experience or are prosthetic. Either way, they become the building blocks from which to construct
narratives of the present and visions for the future” (Landsberg 2004, 41). This is problematic,
however; not only does it blur the distinction between real and prosthetic that Landsberg elsewhere
tries to maintain, but it suggests a hopefulness I think is unwarranted: except in the tacked-on,
studio-imposed happy ending of the 1982 release version, Deckard and Rachel have no future. As
replicants, they have only brief lifespans; ending the film with the two of them in an elevator, going
down, is strongly suggestive of doom. Given Blade Runner’s obvious debt to film noir, it is difficult
not to be reminded of the ending of John Huston’s seminal The Maltese Falcon (1941), where Sam
Spade (Humphrey Bogart), having turned the woman he loves over to the police after realizing that
she was a murderer, watches the cops take her down in the elevator, and then turns and begins
walking down the stairs: both are doomed, even if the descent of one will be a bit slower than that
of the other.
The artificiality of the prosthetic memories in Blade Runner is deeply disquieting, because it means
that they can be accessed by the powerful. Your past is no longer your own. The only freedom lies
in fatalistically living life to the fullest from the moment you realize this; only the memories that
come after becoming aware that you are a replicant are worth cherishing, because only those can
be known to be real. The fugitive replicants chased by Deckard lack prosthetic memories: they
know that they are artificial people. Their leader Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer) gives a dying speech
(famous enough to have its own wikipedia.com entry, viz. “Tears in rain monologue”) to Deckard,
whose life he has magnanimously spared:
I’ve seen things you people wouldn’t believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the dark near the
Tannhäuser Gate. All those moments will be lost in time, like tears...in...rain. Time to die.
 
Blade Runner (Final Cut 2007): Rutger Hauer as Batty. Filmcompagniet/Warner.
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Batty is a compelling figure with the glamour and power of a rebel angel, but the tragic grandeur of
his words on the evanescence of memory would be undercut completely if it turned out that the
sights he recalls were just part of the standard-issue starship trooper memory package. We come
to empathize with Batty, to see him as fully human and his death as a tragedy, precisely because he
has memories that are his own. Landsberg is mistaken to regard Blade Runner as a demonstration
of the emancipatory potential of prosthetic memories: on the contrary, the replicants’ freedom and
humanity depend on having real memories and knowing the illusory ones for what they are.
It’s like a Dream
Total Recall is a big-budget action movie (at the time, one of the most expensive movies ever
made), presenting itself as noisy and violent pulp entertainment. Douglas Quaid (Arnold
Schwarzenegger) is a construction worker who dreams of visiting Mars. He goes to Rekall, a
company that sells prosthetic memories, to buy a memory of having been to Mars, with an
alternate identity as a secret agent. Something apparently goes wrong with the procedure, and
suddenly he is being pursued by trained killers, his wife attacks him, claiming that she is not his
wife, and he discovers a mysterious video message, recorded by himself, telling him to go to Mars.
On Mars, a group of rebels is fighting the tyrannical governor Cohaagen, who oppresses the lower
classes, many of whom have suffered disfiguring mutations. Quaid finds his way to the rebels, but
is tracked down by Cohaagen’s minions, who kill the rebel leader. In a new video, Quaid’s alter ego
explains that his name is actually Hauser, and he is Cohaagen’s trusted lieutenant, a smug, jeering
villain. All Quaid’s memories are artificial; Hauser had them implanted, suppressing his own identity
in order to infiltrate the rebels. But when Quaid is put in the machine to be turned back into Hauser,
he breaks free. Cohaagen turns off the air supply in the sector of the Mars colony where the rebels
are concentrated, but just as everyone is about to suffocate, Quaid manages to activate a huge
machine built by aliens, bringing breathable air to the whole of Mars, saving himself and all the
rebels.
What Landsberg finds particularly appealing in this story is the protagonist’s choice to embrace his
prosthetic memories. He elects to stay Quaid, even though he knows that “Quaid” is an artificial
construct. He prefers that to being turned into the evil Hauser, even though he learns that Hauser is
his authentic self. She thinks this is a hopeful message: “By the end of Total Recall, Quade [sic]
understands that his is not an authentic identity, but he decides to live as Quade because that
identity, unlike that of Hauser, is the one that permits him to have empathy for the Mutants. As the
film demonstrates, the acquisition of prosthetic memories is a crucial step toward learning how to
experience empathy” (Landsberg 2004, 47).
There is another side to the story, however, noticed even at the time of the film’s first release by
observant reviewers like Roger Ebert (Ebert 1990). There are a number of indications that the
whole of Total Recall, from the point where Quaid is put into the machine at Rekall, is in fact itself
the prosthetic memory he has bought from the company [3].When the salesman at Rekall describes
the “Ego Trip” – the secret agent add-on to Quaid’s prosthetic memory of a trip to Mars – what he
outlines is the story of the movie: “You are a top operative back under deep cover on your most
important mission. People are trying to kill you left and right. You meet this beautiful exotic woman.
I don’t want to spoil it for you, Doug, but you rest assured that by the time the trip is over, you get
the girl, kill the bad guys, and save the entire planet” (00:15:38-00:15:58) [4]. Quaid can pick the
characteristics of the exotic woman from a menu (“Slim, athletic, or voluptuous?” [00:17:35-
00:17:38]), and a picture of the woman of his specifications appears on a screen. She is the
woman, Milena (Rachel Ticotin), he will meet in the rebel hideout on Mars and with whom he will
share a final kiss as the newly air-filled atmosphere of Mars turns the sky blue. And as the memory
program is loaded into the machine, a technician mentions that its title is “Blue sky on Mars”
(00:16:53).
Nor is this all. In a key scene about an hour into the film, Quaid receives a visit in the hotel room
where he is staying from Dr. Edgemar, a man we have previously glimpsed in a Rekall commercial.
He explains to Quaid that everything he has experienced is a dream of sorts, but not exactly the
prosthetic memory he had ordered. He has suffered a “schizoid embolism” and become lost in his
own mind. Edgemar has been inserted into his mind to help him:
With no one to guide you out, you’ll be stuck in permanent psychosis. […] The walls of reality will come crashing down. One minute, you’ll be
the savior of the rebel cause, and the next thing you know, you’ll be Cohaagen’s bosom buddy. You’ll even have fantasies about alien
civilizations, as you requested, but in the end, back on Earth, you’ll be lobotomized. (01:04:51-01:05:10)
 Total Recall (1990): Dr.
Edgemar (Roy Brocksmith) offers the reality pill to Quaid (Arnold Schwarzenegger) while his wife Lori (Sharon
Stone) looks on. (Frame grab, Total Recall Ultimate Rekall Edition Blu-Ray, Studiocanal/Universal 2012).
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Edgemar gives Quaid a pill he has to swallow as a sign of his acceptance that he is caught in a
dream. Quaid sees a bead of sweat running down Edgemar’s face, but since Edgemar should feel no
fear if he was merely an imaginary projection, Quaid concludes he must be a real person trying to
trick him and blows his brains out with his handgun. Everything Edgemar described then comes to
pass: walls come crashing down (again and again), Quaid finds out he is Cohaagen’s henchman
Hauser, and with the help of the cyclopean power plant left behind by mysterious aliens, he saves
the rebels. As they look up at the newly-blue sky, Milena says, “I can’t believe it. It’s like a dream.”
Quaid turns to her and says: “I just had a terrible thought. What if this is a dream?” She replies:
“Then kiss me quick before you wake up” (01:49:18-01:49:32). As they kiss, white light fills the
screen. The End.
Landsberg does not mention any of these indications that the whole story of Total Recall may be a
dream. The director, Paul Verhoeven, has said on a number of occasions that the dream/reality
ambiguity was what attracted him to the project, and in the commentaries he has recorded for DVD
editions of the film, he repeatedly emphasizes the elements that support the dream interpretation.
He suggests, for instance, that the white light at the end is Quaid being lobotomized, his
consciousness extinguished: “That’s why we faded to white instead of going to black, because his
brains are blown out” (Schwarzenegger and Verhoeven [2001], 01:50:02-01:50:08; cf. Verhoeven
2012, 00:25:04-00:25:39) [5].
Landsberg’s claims about the empathy-building potential of prosthetic memories require that
Quaid’s moral choice to remain Quaid is a real choice and not just part of the “Ego Trip”: he must
choose to tear himself free from the machine to avoid being turned (back) into Hauser, to be a
champion of the oppressed rather than the tyrant’s heartless henchman. But if the whole story is
really a prosthetic memory gone awry, Quaid’s crucial choice is to refuse the pill given him by
Edgemar, electing to stay in the action fantasy.
As Verhoeven astutely points out, the audience will want Quaid to make this choice, because they
also want the action fantasy to go on, however implausible it is. The script teasingly makes explicit
this implausibility. When Quaid reacts to Edgemar’s explanations with an incredulous “Bullshit!”
Edgemar replies: “What’s bullshit, Mr. Quaid? That you’re having a paranoid episode triggered by
acute neuro-chemical trauma? Or that you’re really an invincible secret agent from Mars who’s the
victim of an interplanetary conspiracy to make him think he’s a lowly construction worker?”
(01:03:33-01:03:52). In interviews, Verhoeven has stated less circumspectly than in the DVD
extras that he believes the first to be true, but that the second is so irresistible to both Quaid and
the audience that they embrace it anyway:
The quintessence of the film is that Quaid likes the dream so much that he does not want to wake up. He does not hesitate to pull the wool
over his own eyes. […] And the funny thing is that the public wants it too. I have noticed in the cinema that during the scene in the hotel
room, the audience are watching very quietly, almost grinding their teeth, as if to say, “Damn, we haven’t been watching a dream for an hour,
have we? Surely we’re not going back to the beginning?” And to their relief Arnold then takes them further on his journey by shooting the
doctor. But it remains a dream. 
 (Verhoeven quoted in Scheers 1997, 222-23)
Prosthetic memories in Total Recall turn out to be much like Hollywood movies (the analogy is
explored in some detail in Karpf 1998); so much more alluring than the real world that people will
immerse themselves in them even though they know what’s going to happen, and even though
they know that they will burn their brains out, unable to get back to reality. Total Recall contradicts
the idea that the acquisition of prosthetic memories might, even potentially, be beneficial and
politically progressive: the film portrays prosthetic memory as deceptive but irresistible wish-
fulfilment, fraudulent and dangerous yet willingly embraced. We need better theoretical tools.
Apparatuses of Deception
One of the things that have made Landsberg’s work attractive to many historians, I think, is her
optimistic suggestion that the experience of history through popular media might “affect people
both intellectually and emotionally, in ways that might ultimately change the way they think and
how they act in the world” (Landsberg 2004, 154). I share this hope. Equally important are her
efforts to defend immersive, mass-cultural forms of history from the disapproving and censorious
view of mass culture in critical theory and among some traditionalist historians. The manufactured
character of mass media works, argues Landsberg, allow them to reach large, popular, and – more
importantly – diverse audiences:
Part of the work of this book is to argue against those critics who see the commodification of mass culture in purely negative terms, those
who regard mass culture as a site of domination, deception, and brain-washing of the masses. Against the “culture industry” model, I
contend that commodification, which is at the heart of mass cultural representations, makes images and narratives widely available to people
who live in different places and come from different backgrounds, races, and classes.
 (Landsberg 2004, 20-21)
However, the notion of “prosthetic memory” itself plays into the very model of domination and
deception to which Landsberg objects.
The culture industry model, of course, springs from the chapter “Enlightenment as Mass Deception:
The Culture Industry” in Horkheimer and Adorno’s book Dialectic of Enlightenment from 1947. They
charge the movies not only with being commodities, but with deceptively offering themselves as
real and with overwhelming the critical faculties of spectators through the slickness of their
presentation:
Far more strongly than the theatre of illusion, film denies its audience any dimension in which they might roam freely in imagination—
contained by the film's framework but unsupervised by its precise actualities — without losing the thread; thus it trains those exposed to it to
identify film directly with reality. The withering of imagination and spontaneity in the consumer of culture today need not be traced back to
psychological mechanisms. The products themselves, especially the most characteristic, the sound film, cripple those faculties through their
objective makeup. They are so constructed that their adequate comprehension requires a quick, observant, knowledgeable cast of mind but
positively debars the spectator from thinking, if he is not to miss the fleeting facts. 
 (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 99-100)
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Arguably, the brilliantly sardonic trick of Total Recall lies in repackaging this dour critique of
Hollywood’s assembly-line disciplining of the human mind as a $60 million Arnold Schwarzenegger
action extravaganza; it makes the audience gleefully complicit in their enslavement to the
Hollywood machine. It is very hard to get away from the brain-washing associations of “prosthetic
memory,” particularly when the film that gives us the literal version of it presents it as precisely a
form of brain-washing; this framing remains whenever the concept is extended metaphorically.
Much of the film theory Landsberg draws on points in the same direction. She discusses the 1930s
empirical studies of youthful moviegoers financed by the Payne Fund, but neglects to mention that
they were part of a concerted effort to “get the goods on the movies, to nail them to the wall”
(Sklar 1994, 134) – an effort, in other words, to strengthen movie censorship driven by fears that
the movies implanted socially undesirable ideas into the heads of young people, brain-washing
them into becoming criminals and sex fiends (see Sklar 1994, 134-40; Black 1996, 151-55; see
also Jowett, Jarvie, and Fuller 1996). We saw earlier how the spectre of brain-washing is also raised
by suture theory, with its emphasis on the fundamentally deceptive nature of popular movies.
Apparatus theory, its close relation, which Landsberg mentions approvingly (Landsberg 2004, 14;
2015, 45), is even more unhelpful.
The premise of apparatus theory, based on the structuralist Marxist theory of Louis Althusser, is that
the cinematic experience is fundamentally deceptive in ways that serve capitalist ideology (Baudry
1970; 1986). The basic set-up of the movie-going experience returns the spectator “to a regressive
state of imaginary wholeness and transcendence, and bound into structures of fantasy, dream, and
desire that are consonant with dominant ideology” (Kuhn and Westwell 2012, s.v. “cinematic
apparatus (apparatus theory)”). The theory was first formulated at the end of the 1960s in the
militantly leftist French film journal Cinéthique, which was hostile to all kinds of regular narrative
filmmaking, with “denunciations of the whole of the output of Hollywood considered as the
monolithic representative of a monolithic entity: ‘bourgeois ideology’ or dominant ideology” (Harvey
1978, 95). Even at the time, many found the kind of structuralist maximalism espoused by the
apparatus theorists unconvincing, as Richard Wolin points out in his book about French Maoism in
the 1968-1974 period, The Wind from the East: “By fetishizing structure as an unyielding,
ontological constant and by dismissing subjectivity as, in essence, one of structure’s ideological
effects, Althusser and his supporters had rashly discounted the masses’ capacity for resistance”
(Wolin 2010, 160).
An account based on apparatus theory would therefore be even less likely than one based on critical
theory to give any grounds for hope that the experience of historical pasts through popular media
might let people learn “to see differently, as if through someone else’s eyes” (Landsberg 2007, 628)
and thereby potentially change how they think and act. The theory entails that the media subject
them to a process of domination and brain-washing even more totalizing than that described by
critical theory [6].
The idea of seeing differently is central to Landsberg’s work; she attempts to show that the cinema
(like other forms of popular media) throughout its history “has authorized and enabled people to
inhabit subject positions and pasts through which they might not themselves have lived and to
which they have no ‘natural’ connection” (Landsberg 2004, 14); and that the resulting experiences
may change people’s minds in ways that potentially advance social justice: “In allowing us to see as
if through others’ eyes, they open up the possibility of empathy, helping us to construct bridges in
the face of difference” (Landsberg 2007, 629). But Landsberg’s attempts to open up such
possibilities are undercut by her reliance on a theory that describes cinema as an apparatus of
deception and domination, unlikely to produce any kind of genuine empathy.
Empathy without Prosthetics
The emphasis Landsberg gives to the idea of seeing “as if through others’ eyes” suggests that our
affective experience of movies is strongly linked to film characters; it is their experience into which
we can enter, undergoing it vicariously. Of the film theorists Landsberg mentions, Steven Shaviro is
probably the one given most weight, but there are a number of difficulties with his account of
affective experience. Not only is his work explicitly idiosyncratic – “I embrace special pleading and
the enthusiasm of the fan as a way of avoiding any appearance of objectivity and universality”
(Shaviro 1993, ix) – he also downplays engagement with characters, their goals, beliefs, and
desires, and instead regards the film experience as a succession of moments of visceral impact with
little concern for the coherence of narrative or character:
I have great difficulty associating faces and names, remembering which actor or character is which. Thus, I am unable to “identify” properly.
Instead, I am affected by continuities and cuts, movements and stillnesses, gradations of color or of brightness. 
 (Shaviro 1993, 255)
The work of Murray Smith, on the other hand, deals specifically with the ways spectators engage
with film characters. Landsberg makes passing reference (Landsberg 2004, 163 n62; also 167 n24)
to his article “Altered States” (Smith 1994), suggesting that one might draw on this work without
traducing her intentions, even if she herself does not go beyond a brief reference.
Smith’s book Engaging Characters (1995) develops the arguments of the article at length. Smith
argues that the concept of identification (with film characters) is imprecise and in many ways
misleading; it fails to capture the gradations of our involvement with film characters. A fundamental
aspect is simple recognition; on top of this, Smith distinguishes between alignment (which
character(s) we follow; spatial attachment is a part of this) and allegiance (which character(s) we
root for). Together, these three types of involvement form the film’s structure of sympathy; they
require “comprehension of the narrative situation and characters,” and our emotional responses
may be different from the characters’ (Smith 1995, 102): if we believe Quaid in Total Recall is in
the throes of a schizoid embolism, we may feel sorry for him when, with contemptuous relish, he
spits the reality pill into the bloody face of Dr. Edgemar’s corpse, satisfied he has made the right
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choice. But films also engage spectators empathetically, where “we simulate or experience the
same affect or emotion experienced by the character” (102). This may be an involuntary response
like affective mimicry, where watching others laugh or cry make us do the same, spreading the
affect to us as well; or, more consciously, we may “imaginatively project ourselves into their [the
characters’] situation, and hypothesize as to the emotions they are experiencing” (97).
Smith calls this deliberate imaginative projection “simulation,” but other cognitive film scholars [7].
like Torben Grodal have argued that empathetic simulation is a much more fundamental aspect of
comprehending stories than Smith’s account might suggest. Grodal argues that internal, embodied
simulation underlies our cognitive comprehension of characters and narrative: “To understand the
character’s situation in depth is to simulate his or her dilemma with eyes, bowels, heart, cognition,
and muscles,” he writes in Embodied Visions (Grodal 2009, 196). Watching Schwarzenegger’s
muscles bulge with effort, the motor action areas of our brains will simulate our own bodies
performing the same action, and this simulation is the basis of our cognitive comprehension that he
is trying to break free from the restraints fastening him to the seat of the memory machine. Grodal
regards simulation of and vicarious experience through fictional characters as fundamental, rather
than observation from the outside: “the nucleus of the story experience is that of the first person,
because from an evolutionary point of view third-person perspectives, even down to the level of
motor activation, are expansions of a first-person perspective. We infer how other people
experience things by extrapolating from our own experiences” (165).
By this account, the basis of our engagement with characters is watching them, their bodies and
faces. “The face is the most important cue for understanding intentions and emotions of other
minds, and the emotions resonate in the viewers via innate resonance systems (mirror neurons)”
(Grodal 2009, 198). This body-oriented approach stands in clear opposition to approaches like
suture theory, which emphasize the discursive: since the latter tend to frame their inquiries with
questions about who “speaks” the images we see, they end up with claims about spectators
supposedly putting themselves “in the position of whichever character is offscreen at any moment”
(Kuhn and Westwell 2012, s.v. “suture”; emphasis added). Instead, Grodal’s theory emphasizes our
investment in the characters that are onscreen, putting ourselves into their bodies: “In film viewing,
we are the body snatchers by letting our self-feelings power some of those characters that we
watch. In the cinema, our minds give up control of our own bodies, which are quietly placed in
seats in dark rooms, and what enter the eyes are emotionally charged audiovisual data of relevance
for the bodies and minds of characters” (Grodal 2009, 193). Grodal’s theory, I submit, is very useful
for explaining the kind of embodied, experiential engagement that Landsberg regards as having the
potential for expanding one’s feelings of social responsibility through having inhabited pasts
different from one’s own [8].
In this article, I have not given a great deal of emphasis to the fact that Landsberg’s work is
focused specifically on historical films and popular media, but the film theories I have criticized
have little to say about the specifics of the historical film either. It is worth pointing out that
Grodal’s theory does. The mental processing of the film experience is modelled by Grodal as a flow,
the last part of which involves an evaluation of the reality status of what we see, marking the
experience as unreal so that we do not duck behind our seats when bullets start flying on the
screen. In most movies, we accept the fictional world as given; it would be absurd to accuse Total
Recall of giving an unfairly biased view of the mutant rebellion of Mars, for instance. But with
historical films, the reality status evaluation would also include an acknowledgement that the
historical film purports, on some level, to be about the actual past, and a weighing of that claim.
Grodal writes of the docudrama, a genre closely related to the historical film: “Because the viewers
are aware of the fact that they are watching a reenactment, they may speculate as to its
correctness, whereas in the case of the typical realist fiction film the filmmakers are credited with
knowledge of the hypothetical phenomena portrayed” (Grodal 2009, 259). The speculations may
affect the willingness of spectators to fully engage with characters.
The discussion of the correctness and authenticity or lack thereof in the presentation of historical
events through popular media can quickly grow tiresome. It is one that Landsberg sensibly tries to
sidestep, enlisting the portrayal of a hyper-mediated future society in Total Recall in support of this
move: “Total Recall systematically undermines any attempt to privilege, or even locate, the
authentic” (Landsberg 2004, 43). Yet this is not really the case. Even if we set aside the dream
interpretation entirely, I do not agree that Quaid’s decision to resist being turned into Hauser means
that he chooses the prosthetic over the authentic. Abstractly regarded, Hauser is the real person,
and Quaid is a fake; but from Quaid’s point of view, and more importantly from our point of view –
since we have been both spatially and emotionally aligned with him from the start of the film –
Quaid is the real person, and Hauser is just a smirking image on a video monitor.
 
Total Recall (1990): Quaid (Arnold Schwarzenegger) comes face to face with his previous self, the evil Hauser,
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henchman of Cohaagen (Ronny Cox). (Frame grab, Total Recall Ultimate Rekall Edition Blu-Ray,
Studiocanal/Universal 2012).
And if we accept the film’s invitation to entertain the idea that Quaid’s adventures on Mars may be
a prosthetically implanted fantasy, it is true that it makes the authentic difficult to locate, but to
Quaid at least, it evidently makes a great deal of difference whether he is a selfless hero who
secures life and social justice for the underclass of an entire society, or an Ego-Tripper who ends up
as a lobotomized vegetable. On the emotional level at least, it is misleading to say that “Total Recall
challenges the value of the distinction between ‘reality’ and simulation” (Landsberg 2004, 46); on
the contrary, the ability to choose the right course of action depends on getting the distinction right.
In the case of Blade Runner, we have also seen how important it is that the memories lost “like
tears in rain” were real and not manufactured. The issue needs a fuller exploration than I can give
here, but I would suggest that the same holds true for all those who use popular media to inhabit
pasts different from their own and consider whether their experience should form the basis for
action.
Conclusion
The concept of prosthetic memory is constructed out of elements from various contradictory,
arguably outdated film theories and an imaginative extension of a science-fictional plot device. I
have tried to show that it comes with such strong associations of fraudulence, mental manipulation,
and brain-washing that it cannot serve the hopeful purposes it is supposed to serve. As we have
seen, these brain-washing associations come from both the film-theoretical underpinnings of the
concept and from the sci-fi sources of the idea. Accordingly, even though it may be a somewhat
quixotic undertaking in view of the popularity of the prosthetic memory concept, I would urge
historians and scholars of historical films and other media representations of the past to seek out a
more realistic set of theoretical tools.
If we want to argue that historical films offer vicarious experiences of the past which can broaden
our understanding of it and allow us to obtain knowledge of it, we need a model of spectatorship
that would support such an argument better than Landsberg’s does. I have argued that by
employing Grodal’s theory of embodied spectatorship, we can still understand, explain, and make
use of the kind of experiential engagement that allow us to see the past “as if through others’
eyes”: engaging films leave us with autobiographical memories of the vicarious experiences we
have had, movie memories that we do not confuse with reality but still afford us a more personal
and empathetic way of inhabiting worlds different from our own.
Notes
[1] The concept is also discussed in her recent book Engaging the Past (Landsberg 2015), but the
substance of the argument remains the same. [Tilbage]
[2] The text by Silverman (1986) that Landsberg refers to as the basis of her use of the term
“suture’ is an extract from a longer work (Silverman 1983).[Tilbage]
[3] These indications, and the possibility that the bulk of the film could be a “dream,’ are discussed
in many studies of the film, including Scheers (1997, 220-23), Becker (2006, 233-50), Lambie
(2012), and Laist (2015, 39-50).[Tilbage]
[4] All timings are taken from the 2012 European Blu-Ray edition of the film: Total Recall Ultimate
Rekall Edition, StudioCanal/Universal (Europe), 2012.[Tilbage]
[5] In the DVD audio commentary he recorded together with Schwarzenegger in 2001, Verhoeven
studiously avoids saying that either the dream or the reality interpretation is more true than the
other, although he makes sure to point out whenever the film provides a clue that supports the
dream interpretation; when Quaid lies down in the machine and the shot goes out of focus, he
remarks: “From now on, boom! the dream starts’ (Schwarzenegger and Verhoeven [2001],
00:18:31-00:18:34). In the interview recorded for the 2012 Blu-Ray release of the film, he
emphasizes the Dr. Edgemar scene: “For me, the most interesting scene in the movie is really when
Dr. Edgemar arrives in Mars and visits Arnold in his hotel room’ (Verhoeven 2012, 00:12:13-
00:12.24). Verhoeven has explained how he deliberately set up a number of the film’s early scenes
to resonate with the double reality theme: the wall-screen changing from news broadcast to idyllic
landscape, a secretary with color-changing fingernails, Quaid’s wife practicing tennis strokes with a
hologram: “We need to prepare the audience by all these little visual tricks [to accept] that other
worlds are possible’ (Verhoeven 2012, 00:11:39-00:11:44). Arnold Schwarzenegger is also, despite
his strong identification with the character of Quaid, clearly open to the possibility that the whole
thing might be a dream. He writes in his autobiography (referring to Quaid as “I’): “Was I really the
hero? Or was it all inside my head, and I’m just a jackhammer operator who may be schizophrenic?
Even at the end, you aren’t necessarily sure’ (Schwarzenegger 2013, 348).[Tilbage]
[6] Strictly speaking, “brain-washing’ is imprecise, since apparatus theory would deny that there is
a “brain,’ an independent subjectivity, at all. There is only washing. That doesn’t make it any less
totalizing, of course.[Tilbage]
[7] Cognitive film theory emerged out of dissatisfaction with the speculative and very broad claims
of psychoanalytic film theory, seeking instead to explain cinematic spectatorship with the help of
cognitive and perceptual psychology as well as detailed historical study, analytical philosophy,
evolutionary theory, and neuroscience, especially affective neuroscience. It is not, as some critics
seem to think, focused on the computational mind (see, e.g.,Shaviro 2008, 50-51), but takes a
strong interest in emotion and embodiment as well. A useful selection of articles can be found in a
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special issue of the journal Film Studies (Barratt and Frome 2006) and in the anthology Cognitive
Media Theory (Nannicelli and Taberham 2014).[Tilbage]
[8] Carl Plantinga (2009) provides a cognitive approach to cinematic spectatorship that gives
greater emphasis to witnessing and sympathetic emotions, but Grodal’s focus on immersion
through embodied simulation makes his model more pertinent here.[Tilbage]
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